Scholars have rediscovered the theory of institutional legitimacy, with a vengeance. This reinvigorated attention has produced some vexing controversies, none of which is more important than that of whether the Supreme Court's legitimacy depends upon satisfying the ideological expectations of the American people. That debate has recently been enlarged by hypotheses about whether ideological dissatisfaction's influence depends upon citizens' beliefs about legal realism and processes of decision-making. Unfortunately, serious measurement issues cloud the literature. Here, we reconsider these questions using a nationally representative sample. We first show that ideological dissatisfaction has practically no impact on legitimacy, irrespective of how dissatisfaction is measured. We then test hypotheses from Positivity Theory, especially the hypothesized conditional effects of citizens' beliefs about judicial decisionmaking, politicization, and ideological dissatisfaction on legitimacy. We conclude that the influence of ideological dissatisfaction has been overstated; greater threats to legitimacy lie in beliefs that judges are just ordinary politicians.
cholarly interest in the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court has exploded in recent years. With this renewed attention, however, a major dispute has emerged: whether citizens' perceived levels of ideological disagreement with the Court's decisions affect the amount of legitimacy they ascribe to the institution. Briefly, Bartels and Johnston (2013) argue that people's ideological dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court is strongly and negatively correlated with individual-level judgments of the Court's legitimacy, while Gibson and Nelson (2015a) , also using a nationallyrepresentative sample, find that dissatisfaction has only a negligible independent effect on support for the Court.
1 Using an opt-in, unrepresentative sample, Christenson and Glick (2015) support Bartels and Johnston's conclusion, discovering that a single salient decision-in this case, the Supreme Court's opinion on the Affordable Care Act-is enough to move judgments of the Court's legitimacy.
How this dispute gets resolved is of enormous theoretical and normative importance.
Classical legitimacy theory 2 holds that public support acts as a "reservoir of goodwill" that allows an institution to make unpopular decisions without public reprisal . If ideological dissatisfaction and legitimacy are as strongly linked as Bartels and Johnston and Christenson and Glick maintain, then legitimacy theory may need serious revision. More tangibly, a Court whose legitimacy is so strongly dependent upon its policy outputs would be 1 For a sampling of what has become a formidable body of work see , Nicholson and Hansford (2014) , Malhotra and Jessee (2014) , and Ura (2014) . For reasons that will become clear below, we focus on the two published papers that specifically incorporate a model of ideological dissatisfaction as an explanation of institutional support.
2 For an exposition of classical legitimacy theory, see Gibson and Nelson (2014) and Tyler (2006) . findings is also suspect. Observers of this scientific debate could be easily forgiven were they completely confused about what conclusions to draw from this important theoretical and empirical literature.
Our purposes in this article are four: (1) We present new evidence on the linkage between ideological dissatisfaction with the Court and institutional support. This evidence is based on a nationally representative sample, so external validity concerns are mitigated. (2) In our analysis of the linkage, we demonstrate that the same conclusions are generated irrespective of which measures are used. (3) Because our findings diverge from those of Bartels and Johnston and
Christenson and Glick, our third goal is to provide an explanation of why the various datasets produce different conclusions. We focus in particular on the difference between diffuse and specific support. (4) Finally, we measure "legalistic attitudes" with more valid and reliable indicators, providing much stronger tests of the positivity hypotheses advocated by Christenson and Glick. Not unexpectedly, we reach entirely different conclusions about the role played by these expectations.
In the end, our goal is to advance this substantive debate over legitimacy and positivity by neutralizing most of the crucial issues of both internal and external validity that have heretofore made the various findings of limited probative value. Our research reconciles many of the literature's conflicting claims, showing that ideological disagreement plays a role in the legitimacy judgments of some of the American people, although that segment of the population is a small one. More importantly, we advance our understanding of legitimacy by drawing attention to the deleterious effects of perceived judicial politicization, a factor that we show plays an outsized role in the legitimacy judgments of the American people. Taken together, our findings seem to support rather than challenge Positivity Theory.
Summarizing the Earlier Findings
All agree that the conventional wisdom documents that institutional support for the U.S.
Supreme Court (diffuse support) is only weakly related to evaluations of the outputs of the institutions (specific support). 5 The relationship between evaluations is "sticky" in the sense that diffuse support does not respond much to dissatisfaction with individual decisions -as in Bush v.
Gore (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003) .
The revisionist view is that Court support does respond to decisional dissatisfaction, mainly through a two-step process: (1) citizens evaluate the decision, and then (2) (2015a, 163) . This view is quite consistent with the notion of a "reservoir of goodwill" -existing support for the Court is not dislodged much by individual judicial decisions, even if sustained dissatisfaction can undermine support (as Gibson and Caldeira (1992) report happened with African Americans).
We acknowledge, of course, that ideological dissatisfaction is simply one component of specific support. Specific support refers to approval of the performance of the institution; policy outputs are obviously a significant part of such evaluations, although there are other aspects of performance that may be important as well.
Conventional wisdom holds that the relationship between specific and diffuse support is a gradual, incremental one. The Court's diffuse support may suffer once some accumulated threshold level of dissatisfaction is reached. Conversely, specific support can be transformed into obdurate diffuse support through a string of pleasing policy decisions; such change is gradual, underscoring the varied and varying relationships often observed between indicators of the two concepts (Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Baird 2001) . The revisionists' findings seem to fundamentally challenge this understanding of how performance evaluations and institutional support are connected.
Crucial to assessing the different discoveries of the three sets of authors is the measures used to calculate ideological dissatisfaction with the Court. Unfortunately, the conclusions drawn by these scholars are closely associated with the survey question they use to measure the ideological location of the Supreme Court. Bartels and Johnston (2013) and Christenson and Glick (2015) Court is a very liberal court, a somewhat liberal court, a somewhat conservative court, or a very conservative court." This question has also come under fire for its omission of a middle category, the lack of which fails to provide respondents a stated option for "moderate"
policymaking (see Bartels, Johnston, and Mark 2015, 777, footnote 13) .
Given that those scholars who have found a strong linkage between perceived ideological location and legitimacy have relied upon the "case-by-case" question while those who have failed to find such a strong connection have relied upon a question that does not offer respondents a middle category, determining the best way to measure the perceived ideological position of the Supreme Court is of paramount substantive importance. That is one of the purposes of our research.
Adding "Legalistic Priors" to the Mix
An important extension of the Christenson and Glick research involves the analysis of "Legalistic Court Priors." As they explain: "A central tenet of the prevailing positivity theory model (e.g., Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003; Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 2011) is that the fact that people view the Court legalistically insulates legitimacy from ideological updating effects" (Christenson and Glick 2015, 412-413 Gibson and Caldeira (2011), Cann and Yates (2014) , and Scheb and Lyons (2000) . 8 Gibson and Caldeira (2009) present evidence on this point, finding that views of a judicial nominee affect views toward the institution. See also Woodson (2015) . However, they find that the effect of the Flip did not depend on whether one held legalistic views or not. Apparently, those with legalistic views of the Court were not particularly or distinctively offended by overt politicization, as embodied in Roberts's behavior.
At the same time, their analysis is said to support the hypothesis that these legalistic priors affect the relationship between ideological distance and change in institutional support, although not in the way originally formulated. Their hypothesis is that "the legitimacy assessments of people who initially view the Court as legalistic will be relatively less affected by new information about the Court's ideology" (Christenson and Glick 2015, 414 (Christenson and Glick 2015, 414, citing Gibson and Caldeira 2009 ).
This is obviously a difficult question for people to answer, in part because it asks them to make a prediction about the future, before the Court had ruled, in part because it ignores any individual differences among the justices in how they make their decisions, and in part because it requires a very high level of information about the decision-making processes within the Court. 9 Strategic behavior has been found to be objectionable because it is self-interested (e.g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001) . In this instance, Roberts's behavior served the interests of the institution, not necessarily his own personal interests. We hypothesize that the three concepts-ideological dissatisfaction, legalistic beliefs, and perceived politicization-interact, with ideological disagreement only affecting the judgments of those who perceive the Court to be ideological in the first place (the original, unsupported Christenson and Glick hypothesis). Among those who do not subscribe to legal realism, the very concept of ideological disagreement is a non-sequitur. Hence, we expect that the effect of ideological disagreement on diffuse support is greater among legal realists.
Also following the logic (though not the findings) of Christenson and Glick, we hypothesize that insincere "political" behavior will have a greater influence than (apparently) sincere ideological decision-making. Politicized activity-judges acting like regular politicians-seems to fly against the Court's normative role in the American political system. Hence, we suggest that the effect of perceived politicization on diffuse support should trump that of either ideological disagreement or legal realism. Such an analysis, of course, requires valid measures of both perceptions of legal realism and judicial politicization.
The TAPS Survey Design
This paper relies on a survey we commissioned on the American Panel Study (TAPS), a monthly online survey. Panelists were first recruited as a national probability sample in the fall of 2011 by Knowledge Networks for the Weidenbaum Center at Washington University. Individuals without internet access were provided a laptop and internet service at the expense of the Weidenbaum Center. Two sample replenishment efforts have kept the panel at approximately 2,000 panelists. In a typical month, about 1,700 of the panelists complete the online survey. More technical information about the survey is available at taps.wustl.edu. 10 10 Calculating the AAPOR response rates for any given survey within complex panel designs such as this is extremely complicated (e.g., Callegaro and DiSogra 2008) . However, the compound rate for our survey is undoubtedly in the single digits.
Measures of Key Concepts Institutional Support
Following closely the conventional wisdom on operationalizing this construct (e.g., Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003) , we have measured the diffuse support of our respondents with a standard set of survey items. Appendix A reports the indicators of institutional support and their univariate frequencies.
This set of measures has very strong psychometric properties. Reliability is highCronbach's alpha = .89. So too is validity. The item set is strongly unidimensional (the second eigenvalue from a Common Factor Analysis (CFA) is a mere .74), and all items load well on the first unrotated factor (minimum loading = .55). These results confirm that this dependent variable is unusually strong in terms of both validity and reliability.
Our survey also included the conventional measures of specific support: assessments of how well the Court is doing its job and judgments about whether the Court's decisions are "just right" (as opposed to "too liberal" or "too conservative"). Most of the respondents (65%) rated the Court as doing at least a "pretty good job," although only 42% judged the Court's decisions as about right. Thus, our data parallel surveys by journalists in documenting dissatisfaction with the contemporary performance of the Supreme Court (e.g., Pew Research Center 2015). The two measures of specific support are moderately correlated at .35.
Diffuse support and performance evaluations are somewhat related. Assessments of how well the Court is doing its job are correlated with the diffuse support index at .40; the "just right" dichotomy is correlated at .24.
Belief in the Myth of Legality/Legal Realism
As we have noted, an important theoretical contribution of the Christenson and Glick article is its test of the hypothesis that prior legal beliefs condition the relationship between ideological dissatisfaction and institutional support. But, as we also noted above, their measure of these beliefs is a simple dichotomy, one, we suspect, suffering from low validity and reliability. We therefore employ a better measure of the construct.
Our survey included three indicators of perceptions of how decisions are made. These measures, which can be considered as indicating whether the respondent embraces legal realism or a legalistic view of judicial decision making. The statements are:
• The U.S. Supreme Court makes its decisions on a case-by-case basis, so it doesn't really make sense to think of it as either liberal or conservative. This three-item set is reasonably reliable (Cronbach's alpha = .72), especially given that so few indicators are included in the scale. And when subjected to Common Factor Analysis (CFA), the item-set is shown to be strongly unidimensional (eigenvalue2 = .67), with strong validity loadings for each of the three items. We created an index measuring belief in legal realism, and, as with all of the variables in the analysis, scaled it to range from 0 to 1 (with high scores indicating a more realistic understanding of judicial decision making).
We also measured perceptions of politicized judicial decision making. Legal realism may include beliefs that court decision making is politicized, but does not necessarily do so. The three items indicating judicial politicization are:
• Supreme Court judges are little more than politicians in robes. (Agree: politicized)
• The justices of the Supreme Court can be trusted to tell us why they actually decide the way they do, rather than hiding some ulterior motives for their In essence, these items measure judgments about whether judges are sincere in their methods of deciding cases, in contrast to acting strategically, as do normal politicians. This item-set is slightly less reliable (Cronbach's alpha = .66), even though the mean inter-item correlation is .39.
Strong evidence of unidimensionality emerges from the CFA (eigenvalue2 = .67), and the validity loadings on the first unrotated factor range from .53 to .70. High scores indicate perceptions that judges behave like ordinary politicians.
The measure of empirical beliefs about realism is correlated with perceived judicial politicization at .48. This means that those who hold more realistic views about how decisions are actually made tend fairly strongly to view judges as akin to ordinary politicians.
What we find more interesting, however, is that legal realism and politicization are far from identical. This no doubt reflects the fact that some may believe that judges rely on their own values, etc., to make decisions, but that they do so in a principled way, which is quite different from ordinary politics. As mentioned above, we hypothesize that belief in legal realism has less impact on institutional support than perceptions of the Court as politicized. Our empirical analysis will provide the evidence necessary for deciding whether it is worth differentiating between citizen perceptions of realism and politicization.
Measures of the Perceived Ideological Location of the Supreme Court
Indicators of ideological dissatisfaction with the Court are a function of the respondent's own ideological position and her or his perception of the ideological location of the Court. Because the former is not controversial, we focus on measuring the perceived ideological location of the The critique of the Gibson and Nelson measure is that it denies to the respondents a center category; those who view the Court as moderate are forced to choose between characterizing the Court as "somewhat liberal" or "somewhat conservative." We therefore sought to determine whether those answering with a "somewhat" response really wanted to say that the Court makes about the same number of liberal and conservative decisions but were denied the opportunity to do so by the question's wording. 
Supreme Court Knowledge
Because of the potentially confounding role of political knowledge, we include knowledge of the Court in our analysis. We measure knowledge with five conventional items. As with many internet surveys, knowledge is high, 12 ranging from 91% knowing that the justices are appointed to the Court to 68% knowing that the Court currently makes less than 100 decisions per year.
More than 36% of the respondents got all five knowledge questions correct; 4% missed all five.
Our survey reproduces the conventional finding about the relationship between knowledge and Court attitudes. "To know the Court" is to love it -the correlation of knowledge and diffuse support is .39. On the other hand, knowledge is only weakly related to performance evaluations (r = .18) and even more weakly related to the specific support dichotomy (r = −.08).
This latter correlation indicates that those more knowledgeable about the institution are less likely (slightly) to judge its decisions as "about right." Internet surveys have no control over respondents who look up the questions on the internet so as to be able to answer knowledge queries correctly.
Analysis: Connecting Diffuse and Specific Support
13 Note that, in general, the correlations are drawn from different portions of the database, reflecting the experimental nature of our research design. To reiterate, however, respondents were randomly assigned to the question-wording conditions. dissatisfaction is measured.
[PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] At the same time, these measures are at least weakly related to performance evaluations, with greater ideological dissatisfaction associated with lower performance ratings in every instance. The relationship for the Bartels and Johnston measure is very weak (r = −.10), but is considerably stronger for the 9-category measure (r = −.20), and even somewhat stronger for the 5-category measure (r = −.23). The correlations with the specific support dichotomy (about right versus not) are stronger across the board: for the Bartels and Johnston measure it is −.38; for the nine-category variable, it is −.40.
The conclusions from this portion of our analysis are clear: Ideological dissatisfaction has practically no implication for institutional support. Indeed, dissatisfaction seems to indicate little more than one aspect of specific support for the current activities of the institution, just as legitimacy theory predicts. The most obvious conclusion from Table 2 is that neither ideological disagreement, measured by comparing the respondent's location with the perception of the Court's location (Model I) nor the specific support ideological evaluation of Court outputs (Model II) has much influence on institutional support. The disagreement coefficient is statistically significant but is quite small. (Because all of the variables vary from 0 to 1 comparisons can be made across the various coefficients.) Instead, institutional support is strongly related to perceived judicial politicization, with those holding more strongly politicized perceptions expressing considerably less support for the Court. Perceived legal realism is also significantly connected to institutional support, but much less strongly so. Notably, those who perceive the Court in realistic terms are more supportive of the institution, not less. The sizes of these coefficients provide some context for the magnitude of the ideological disagreement effect-about half the size of the effect of legal realism and only about one-eighth of the size of the effect of politicization. Some of the control variables are statistically significant, but, generally, the influences of the controls are minimal. Overall, a considerable amount of the variance in institutional support is explained by these predictors. 15 In Appendix C, we add measures of democratic values to this equation (as well as every equation we present in the paper), demonstrating (a) that our findings are robust to the inclusion of democratic values, and (b) that the effects of democratic values are larger than those of ideological distance (a finding consistent with the results reported by Gibson and Nelson (2015a) ). Politicization, which is not the same thing as realism, substantially detracts from support.
Predicting Diffuse Support
It remains to consider the important interactive hypotheses put forth by Christenson and Glick.
Testing the Positivity Hypotheses
Relying on Positivity Theory, Christenson and Glick argue that legalistic views of the Court should inoculate the institution from any negative consequences of growing ideological distance between the institution and the citizen. They find, however, that the effect of legalistic priors is exactly the opposite of their prediction: the institutional support of those with legalistic views is actually more sensitive to ideological dissatisfaction than among those without legalistic views.
We have suggested above that one way in which these findings make sense is to assume that legalistic priors are actually normative expectations favoring legalism, and that highly salient cases like ACA reveal information that the Court is not acting legalistically, thereby subtracting from institutional support.
In our analysis, we refine this hypothesis somewhat by considering our measures of both perceived legal realism and perceived judicial politicization. Because our measure of perceived legal realism is most similar to the Christenson and Glick measure, we begin by testing for an interactive effect of this variable, investigating the extent to which perceptions of legal realism condition the effects of ideological disagreement with the Court.
Our data provide some evidence of such an interactive effect. In a model that adds the realism/ideological dissatisfaction interaction term to the equation reported in Table 2 (above), the increment in R 2 is statistically significant at p = .033 (and, by definition, the significance of the coefficient on the interaction term is the same). When legal realism is at its lowest, the effect of ideological dissatisfaction is .07 (p = .254, coefficient in the wrong direction). When realism is at its highest, the coefficient is −.14, a significant but small effect. Thus, with our measure of perceived legal realism -which we consider to be more reliable and more valid -we cannot reproduce the Christenson and Glick findings. Indeed, these results suggest the exact opposite:
that ideological distance has an effect only upon those who are legal realists.
However, the story is reversed for judicial politicization. When its interaction term is added to the equation in Table 2 , the increment in R 2 is significant at .010. When perceived politicization is at its lowest, the effect of ideological dissatisfaction is −.22, which is significant at p = .001. When perceived politicization is at its highest, the coefficient is .07 (implying that greater ideological dissatisfaction is associated with more institutional support); however, this effect is not distinguishable from zero. In general, the results suggest that, for those who do not view the Court as politicized, ideological disagreement has a statistically significant and negative effect on diffuse support, but that the magnitude of that effect declines as people increasingly see Table 2 with the three-way multiplicative interaction between perceptions of legal realism, judicial politicization, and ideological disagreement (and their constituent terms). Table 3 reports the results of this regression and Figure 1 illustrates the various relationships further.
[PLACE Because our primary hypothesis of interest is the potentially varying relationship between ideological disagreement and diffuse support, Figure 1 plots the marginal effect of ideological disagreement as perceptions of both legal realism and judicial politicization vary. The first conclusion we draw from Figure 1 is that some belief in legal realism is a prerequisite to the expected relationship between ideological disagreement and diffuse support materializing.
Indeed, as the lower-left panel shows, there is no relationship between ideological disagreement and diffuse support-at any value of perceived politicization-for those respondents who are not legal realists. Put simply, those who view the Court as fundamentally legalistic give the institution a free pass when it makes disagreeable decisions.
17
16 Note that adding the specific support dichotomy to the equation reported in Table 3 has practically no effect at all on the estimates of the coefficients.
17 Because "Low" and "High" values of these continuous variables are operationalized in the figure as the 25th and 75th quartiles of the data, one may wonder about the behavior of the few respondents who hold especially legalistic beliefs: those that scored below the 25th Second, as the top two panels show, ideological disagreement has the strongest deleterious effects on diffuse support among those individuals who hold the most unequivocal perceptions of legal realism. Just as those individuals who fail to perceive the Court as ideological do not hold the Court into account when it makes decisions they dislike, the segment of the American people who views the Court's decisions as ideological considers ideology when evaluating the institution.
These conclusions stand in direct opposition to the findings of Christenson and Glick.
Their analysis suggests that increased support for legal realism is associated with a reduced role of ideological disagreement. We reach the opposite conclusion. As one becomes a stronger and stronger legal realist, the deleterious effects of ideological disagreement on diffuse support also increase.
The final conclusion this figure supports is that the level of politicization conditions realism's effect on the relationship between ideological disagreement and diffuse support. As the panel in the lower-right demonstrates, the strongest relationship between ideological disagreement and diffuse support materializes when belief in politicization is at its lowest, and the relationship attenuates until respondents begin to see the Court as politicized. Once legal realists believe that the Court is politicized, there is no longer a statistically significant percentile on perceived legal realism. The top two panels of Figure 1 shed some light on these individuals, suggesting that they actually exhibit a positive relationship between ideological disagreement and diffuse support (more disagreement, more support). Perhaps, among those who subscribe exclusively to a legalistic view of judicial decision-making, disagreeable decisions are taken as a sign that the Court is fulfilling its role as a check on the democratic process, as implied by the constitution, thus increasing the esteem these individuals accord to the Court. However, as the distributions of the data at the bottom of the panels show, this pertains to only a tiny proportion of the sample. relationship between diffuse support and ideological disagreement -views on politicization take over.
A simple way to illustrate the preempting effect of politicization is to view the predicted values from the equation reported in Table 3 . Table 4 Table 4 also enables us to compare the relative change in diffuse support as one moves from a "low" to "high" value of a variable, holding constant the values of the other two constituent terms to the interaction. Such comparisons make clear that the effect of politicization far outweighs the effects of either legal realism or ideological disagreement. The largest difference between "low" and "high" values in Table 4 for perceived realism is a paltry .07, while the smallest change as one varies perceived politicization across the interquartile range is .11. And, in the other three cases, moving from a low to high view of judicial politicization [PLACE FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
But how many of the American people meet this condition? As an estimate, Table 4 also reports the percentages of the American people who populate each cell. Since ideological disagreement has an effect among only those legal realists who believe the Court is not politicized, we are interested in the lower-left hand cells of each of the major columns in Table 4 .
Here, we see that about 22% (13.2% + 8.3%) of the American people are expected to judge the Court on ideological terms, and only a minority of those people-8.3% of the public-are individuals who perceive the Court as fairly distant from themselves. For the remaining portion of this 22%, ideology may matter in principle, but they are fairly satisfied with the Court's outputs, providing them little reason to penalize the Court for its decisions.
In short, the overarching lessons of our analysis are threefold: (1) ideological disagreements do sometimes affect individual-level judgments of diffuse support; (2) the conditions under which ideological disagreement matter-and when ideological disagreement is severe enough to matter substantively-are rare, affecting less than 1-in-10 people; and (3) even among those for whom ideology might matter, the magnitude of the effect of ideological disagreement is insignificant in contrast to the effect of politicization.
Discussion and Concluding Comments
Our analyses support several major conclusions. First, as in earlier research, diffuse support and specific support are connected, but not inordinately so. Second, one component of specific support -ideological dissatisfaction -has very little to do with diffuse support among a large majority of the American people. Third, that conclusion is entirely robust to alternative measures of ideological dissatisfaction. From the analysis of these new data we strongly reinforce the conclusions of Gibson and Nelson (2015a) .
Fourth, we do not find evidence supporting the Christenson and Glick findings regarding perceived legal realism. Where they found that increases in perceived legalism are associated with a more substantial role for ideology, we find the opposite: among those who perceive the Court through a legalist lens, ideology has no role to play. Perceived realism has few consequences for institutional support, most likely, we suspect, because some perceive realism and applaud it, others see and condemn it, while some see it and judge it inevitable and therefore are agnostic as to its desirability.
Fifth, perceptions of judicial politicization are important. Where Christenson and Glick conclude that perceptions of politicization exacerbate the effects of ideology, we again reach the opposite conclusion: ideology has no effect among those who perceive the Court to be politicized. Reinforcing the findings of Gibson and Caldeira (2009) , those who see the judiciary as more politicized, as more similar to ordinary politics, tend to support the Supreme Court less.
But, and sixth, these perceptions of politicization interact with ideological dissatisfaction.
When citizens perceive the Court as politicized, they punish it for behaving like a legislature;
only among those citizens who believe the Court is not politicized does ideological dissatisfaction play a role. Our major finding is nuanced: ideological disagreement affects diffuse support only among the 8% of the American public who both view the Court through the lens of legal realism and who judge the Court to be non-politicized. Thus, we reconcile the conflicting claims of Bartels and Johnston and Gibson and Nelson: under some conditions, for some relatively small groups of people, ideological disagreement does play a role in individuallevel judgments about legitimacy.
Despite the strength of our findings, this is an area of inquiry that requires further thought and empirical research. The relationships we have discovered are both complex and conditional.
Our study provides insights into the attitudes of the American people at only a snapshot in time.
Future research should examine how Americans make their judgments about the Court's politicization and decision-making practices, the extent to which those judgments are stable, and the temporal dynamics of these relationships.
We must also acknowledge some important limitations to our research. For instance, as Some additional comments about measurement are also in order. Our view is that one reason why the literature on institutional support is in a bit of disarray has to do with measurement. Only a very small proportion of the research in the field addresses basic issues of validity and reliability. We obviously have devoted considerable effort to measuring perceptions of the Court's ideological location in this research, and we hope we have put that measurement issue to bed. But scholars in the field routinely confuse diffuse and specific support, put forth measures with no face validity at all (e.g., measures that are empirical when they are conceptualized to be normative), and rarely are validity and reliability discussed and practically never are validity and reliability factored into substantive research conclusions.
We include in this criticism our own measures of perceived realism and politicization.
Perhaps one reason why our results on this score are complicated is that we still have not fully understood the context in which the American people perceive, understand, and evaluate their highest court. We are certain that some believe the Court ought to strictly follow the law no matter the consequences, while others are more interested in achieving fairness. We are certain that normative and empirical views often get confused. We are certain that large gaps in the empirical knowledge of the American citizenry exist, especially when it comes to the question of how judges actually make decisions. And, we are certain that the measures we put forth in this paper can benefit from considerable additional psychometric improvement.
We conclude with some observations about how our findings relate to the seemingly conventional wisdom that the Court today finds itself in serious trouble with its constituents.
While many would be quick to attribute the decline in the Court's support to its decisions, we do not. After all, just as the Court has ruled liberally in many high profile cases, such as those concerning same-sex marriage and health care, it has ruled conservatively in major cases involving contraception and the death penalty, perhaps negating much of the ideological valence of its decisions. Instead, these findings document the importance of beliefs among the American people that the Court is a political-rather than strictly legal-institution. We note, however, that "political" and "ideological" are different descriptors. Perhaps any decline in support for the institution that we see reported in the news is due to changes in these beliefs (spurred, perhaps, by intemperate and politicized dissents by some justices). The Court, our data suggest, should worry less about angering the public with its policy decisions, and focus more on the public's satisfaction with its processes, procedures, and politics, if it is to avoid putting its popular legitimacy at risk. .000 N 640
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